BOOK REVIEWS by unknown
1300K REVIEWS
Anson on Contract. American Edition. By Arthur L. Corbin. New York,
Oxford University Press. i9ig. pp. lvii, 568.
The Law of Contract by Sir William R. Anson is probably the best short book
yet published on that subject. It was written primarily for use in the instruction
of students, being designed to present a clear and concise tracing in outline o
the principles which govern contractual relations from their formation to their
discharge. How admirably its author succeeded in the accomplishment of this
purpose is well known, at least, to those who attempt instruction in the subject
of Contracts.
Professor Corbin has now come forth with the third American copyright
edition, the second being that of Professor Huffcut which appeared in 19o6.
The text of the edition now under consideration is that of the fourteenth
English edition. But the latter half of the book has been entirely rearranged
topically, and there appear about thirty-five sections of text which are the work
of Professor Corbin. He has used most of the citations of authority in the
footnotes of Professor Huffcut's last edition but has added many recent
American authorities. We note the addition of numerous critical notes which
represent careful and extended study by Professor Corbin. These constitute
one of the most striking and valuable features of the book.
To a student familiar with Anson's Contracts, as it has heretofore appeared,
there might occur the questions, Why should there be another edition? Have
there been developments that need to be noticed? Are there defects in the
original text which should be remedied? These latter questions, it is believed,
should be answered in the affirmative and, indeed, are answered best by the
illuminating additions themselves. In contrast to the balance of Anson's admir-
able discussion, his treatment of the two very important topics, "Contracts for
the Benefit of Third Persons," and "Conditions," strike a critical reader as less
satisfactory than the other topics, as lacking in comprehensiveness and clearness
of analysis. Surely the necessity for a thorough consideration of these important
topics is in itself ample justification for the edition in hand.
That the law is not a set of static principles is a fact not widely enough
appreciated. The law at a given time is but an approximate reflection of
society's ideas of justice. As our society develops and conditions change there
will be changes in its notions of right and wrong. The law will as surely grow
and as surely change as does the image in a mirror when the object before it
has been changed, though not with that same promptness. The law's reflection
of society's changed notion is always like an echo, belated. It must of necessity
be indefinite and uncertain so long as society cannot formulate definitely its
notions, or is divided within itself. Still, at the same rate and in the same
manner as the mores of society change, so will the law change. Professor Corbin
has in several places thrown into clear relief this characteristic of the law and
guarded his reader against the erroneous notion often entertained that the law
is a fixed and invariable system.
That new progress in legal thinking is seriously hampered by the lack of a
recognized terminology of definite and invariable connotation is a further fact
which is meeting with slow but increasing recognition. Probably the most
considerable contribution of recent years toward overcoming this handicap
was made by Professor Corbin's colleague, the late Professor Wesley N. Hohfeld,
of the Yale School of Law. In two articles, which have so far appeared only in
['34
BOOK REVIEWS
(1913) 23 YALE LAW JOURNAL, i6 and (1917) 26 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 710,
Hohfeld pointed out much of the difficulty above referred to. As the chemist
has isolated a number of substances which he has termed "elements" and has
shown all the complex substances which appear around us in the material world
to be composed of these elements, or combinations of them, and to be capable
of being disassociated, so did Professor Hohfeld find that all of our complex
legal conceptions are made up of aggregates, often variable, of simpler funda-
mental conceptions. He reached a point where he found conceptions which
defied further analysis. The term "right," he concluded, should connote an
idea of the basic or fundamental, such as is embodied in chemistry in the terms
hydrogen, oxygen or sulphur. Sulphuric -acid is a complex substance made up
of the elements hydrogen, oxygen and sulphur. So Professor Hohfeld con-
cluded, such a jural conception as "property" or "legal title" is made up of an
aggregate of simpler jural conceptions, often variable, namely, rights, privileges,
powers, immunities, their correlatives and their opposites. He expressed his
analysis in the following scheme of jural correlatives and opposites:
C right privilege power immunity
Correlatives duty no-right liability disability
O right privilege power immunity
Opposites no-right duty disability liability
He showed by reference to well-known legal works and court decisions that
so simple a term as "right" has been used in a half dozen different senses and
oftentimes with little or nothing to indicate which meaning was intended to
be conveyed by the term, or that the user was aware of the unfortunate looseness
in the use of it. At one time "right" is used in its proper sense, as the cor-
relative of "duty"; again it is used when "privilege" or "power" or "immunity"
would go far to add to clarity and precision. Such a complex conception 
as
"legal title" will be used to describe the jural relation of one who acquires
what is commonly termed "absolute property" in a physical res, as 
well as
that jural relation which exists in one who acquires as purchaser a res 
by virtue
of a contract induced by fraud. The same term is used of one who 
acquires a
res under a contract of sale containing one or more restrictive covenants. 
And
yet again the term employed of a principal after he has delivered possession
of a chattel to an agent with power to sell. If these and other 
jural relations
which are frequently described by the same term are analyzed, it is easily 
seen
that they are very different in content. The fallacies of a syllogism in whose
premises the apparently common term marks variant content need no elucidation.
If we are to make progress in clearness of legal thought, then, we must 
eschew
the use of terms of such variable connotation and adopt a terminology 
which
embodies definiteness and constancy of connotation. It is, indeed, 
one of the
many meritorious features of Professor Corbin's book that he has 
embodied
in 'it Professor Hohfeld's terminology and analytical method. 
He has generally
done this by means of critical footnotes, the value of which it 
would be hard
to overestimate. Occasionally, however, he finds it necessary to 
insert entirely
new sections, as in Sections 37a, 274a, 373, 385, 386 and 401. For this 
purpose
and for the further purpose of making necessary supplements 
and corrections
in the text, he has also inserted several valuable new sections 
dealing with
the general subjects, "Infants," "Contracts for the Benefit 
of Third Persons,"
and "Conditions." The problems in these topics are well analyzed 
and the
rules stated with admirable clearness and conciseness.
Another merit of Professor Corbin's book, which deserves notice, 
is a result
of his adoption of the analytical method of attack above 
referred to. In
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numerous places he emphasizes the necessity of sharply distinguishing between
facts of life and the jural relations consequent upon such facts. An illustration
of the practical value of the point under consideration is seen in note 3 on page
53 where our editor considers the subject "Irrevocable Offers." After observing
that Professor Langdell, in his Summary of the Law of Contracts, has asserted
that an irrevocable offer is "a legal impossibility," which view is held by other
writers of prominence as well, he analyzes the problem and reaches the conclu-
sion that there is nothing impossible either in the conception itself or its appli-
cation. If by "offer" is meant the act which is done by the offeror, of course,
that cannot be revoked, because it is now a part of history. "But," says he,
"if we mean by 'offer' the legal relation that results from the offeror's act, the
power then given to the offeree of creating contractual relations by doing certain
voluntary acts on his part, then the offer may be either revocable or irrevocable
according to the circumstances. The idea of an irrevocable power is not at all
an unfamiliar one." It is organized society's notion of justice, backed by its
power to compel observance of its rules, which causes that legal relation known
as "power" to result from the voluntary doing of acts called an "offer." It causes
that relation to result because, according to its present ideas of justice, it should
result. If there are circumstances, according to those same ideas, which make
it unjust that other and subsequent acts called "revocation" should result in the
extinguishing of the "power" already existing in the offeree, that same organized
society may reasonably refuse to cause that legal result, which we may also
define as "revocation," to follow. It is submitted that Professor Corbin's con-
clusion is correct and that it could not have been reached without the aid of
a discriminating analysis. This one example must suffice to show the practical
necessity for, and value of, such accurate analysis in the solution of legal
problems.
It is the writer's belief that an entirely new book from the pen of Professor
Corbin, where he would have had a freer hand, would have resulted in even
a better piece of work. Yet only a casual comparison is necessary to produce
conviction that the edition in hand is much the most valuable that has yet
appeared. In some very vital respects, as a reference book, it will soon be
recognized as very helpful. Of course, it makes no pretense of being exhaustive
in the citation of authority. The book, however, will command the attention of
the lawyer, as well as the student, who seeks either a clear and concise statement
of the principles of Contract or a suitable aid to the development of the power
of legal analysis.
H. W. ARANT.
Lamar School of Law, Emory University.
A Society of States. By W. T. S. Stallybrass. New York, E. P. Dutton & Co.
1919. pp. xvi, 243.
Mr. Stallybrass has written a sensible and straightforward discussion of the
juristic problems involved in the concept of a League of Nations. He has
particularly addressed himself to the diminution of sovereignty which is sup-
posed to result from submission to the verdict of the League; and he has, of
course, no difficulty whatever in showing it to be groundless. The book has
little claim to originality; but it is clearly and sensibly written and will doubt-
less help those whose problems are still in the realm of theory rather than of
practice.
HAROLD J. LASK1.
Harvard University.
